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Abstract
It is well known that perspective alignment plays a major role in
the planning and interpretation of spatial language. In order to un-
derstand the role of perspective alignment and the cognitive processes
involved, we have made precise complete cognitive models of situated
embodied agents that self-organise a communication system for di-
aloging about the position and movement of real world objects in their
immediate surroundings. We show in a series of robotic experiments
which cognitive mechanisms are necessary and sufficient to achieve
successful spatial language and why and how perspective alignment
can take place, either implicitly or based on explicit marking.
1 Introduction
Spatial language consists of expressions that involve spatial positions and
movements of objects in the world. Spatial language always involves perspec-
tive [Schober, 1993, this volume]. For example, the meaning of the phrase
“the ball left of the glass” depends on the spatial position of the viewer with
respect to the objects involved. Moreover this viewer can be the speaker
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(egocentric) or the hearer or somebody else involved in the conversation (al-
locentric). In any case, if speaker and hearer perceive a scene from different
perspectives, they need to align the perspective from which the scene is be-
ing described in order to make sense of the description. Often perspective is
implicit and dialogue partners must then indirectly align perspective. But
natural languages have also various ways to make perspective explicit, as in
“the ball to my left” (see also Carlson and Hill, this volume).
The goal of our work is to explain these well known facts. Concretely, we
would like to understand why perspective is unavoidable in spatial language,
how dialogue partners can still align perspective even if it is not marked,
and why and how marking helps. We would also like to understand how the
whole system can come off the ground, in other words how spatial language
involving implicit or explicit perspective alignment can be learned or invented
through negotiation in consecutive dialogues.
Our explanations will be based on making very precise and complete mod-
els of communicating embodied agents, situated in a particular real world
environment. The models are complete in the sense that they include mech-
anisms for achieving physical behavior in the real world, vision for the con-
struction of situation models, cognitive mechanisms for developing and using
spatial categories like left/right, forward/backward, close/far, and mecha-
nisms for developing and using lexicons. Our models have been completely
formalised and implemented on physical robots so that we can test their ef-
fectiveness and behavior in repeatable experiments. In each experiment, we
set the agents up to play situated language games in the form of dialogues
about the objects in their world. The agents describe to each other the move-
ment of a ball in their close proximity. Because spatial language is obviously
a very useful and effective way to do so, we expect it to emerge as part of
consecutive games.
We will make three arguments:
1. As soon as agents are embodied, they necessarily have a specific view on
the world and spatial language becomes impossible without considering
perspective. We will show this by an experiment in which first the
agents see the world through the same camera (in other words two
agents use the same robot body) and hence they have exactly the same
visually derived situation model. And second the agents are made to see
the world through their own camera and so they each have a different
situation model. The experiment clearly shows that in the second case,
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a communication system cannot come off the ground: They cannot
learn the meaning of spatial terms from each other, and they generally
fail to understand each other.
2. Perspective alignment is possible when the agents are endowed with two
abilities: (i) to see where the other one is located, and (ii) to perform a
geometric transformation known as Egocentric Perspective Transform.
This transformation allows the agent to compute what the scene looks
like from the viewpoint of the other, in other words to develop a sit-
uation model from the other partner’s perspective. The Egocentric
Perspective Transform is normally carried out in the parietal-temporal-
occipital junction [Zacks et al., 1999] and used for a wide variety of non-
linguistic tasks, such as prediction of the behavior of others or naviga-
tion [Iachini and Logie, 2003]. We have implemented these capabilities
and performed an experiment in which agents test systematically from
which perspective an utterance makes sense. They are thus able to
implicitly align perspective, but only because they are both grounded
and situated in the same real world setting. The experiment demon-
strates that agents are in this case able to bootstrap spatial language
and achieve successful communication. Note that this is still without
explicitly marking perspective.
3. Perspective alignment takes less cognitive effort if perspective is marked.
We investigate this through another experiment that compares the im-
plicit way of perspective alignment (as in (2)) with one where perspec-
tive becomes marked because the lexical processes now express to what
perspective the speaker/hearer is aligned (egocentric or allocentric).
We observe a significant decrease of cognitive effort. This experiment
shows additionally that our models are adequate for demonstrating how
perspective markers can be invented and learned. This is not a simple
problem and children can only do it fairly late in language development.
The remainder of the paper is in two parts. The first part gives more
details on the experimental setup and on the various cognitive mechanisms
that make up the agent architecture. The second part reports results of our
experiments. A final part of the paper derives some conclusions.
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Figure 1: Agents embodied in physical robots. The speaker (in robot A) and
the hearer (in robot B) together observe ball movement events and then play
a language game to describe the scene to each other.
2 Experimental Setup
A lot of work has recently been done on studying human dialogue [Clark,
1996, Pickering and Garrod, 2004]. The methodological approach discussed
here is entirely complementary. We take the findings of these investigations
as given but try to see what it takes to build synthetic models of dialogue,
which obviously requires a ‘mechanistic’ theory of all the processes involved in
dialogue and a concrete setup where we can test these processes. Moreover we
are interested to understand how spatial language with perspective marking
can arise in a population, motivated by attempts to understand the origins
and evolution of communication systems [Steels, 2003].
Our experiment uses physical robotic ‘agents’, which roam around freely
in an unconstrained in-door environment (see figure 1). The agents have
subsystems for autonomous locomotion and vision-based obstacle avoidance.
They maintain a real-time analog model of their immediate surroundings
based on visual input (see figure 2). Using this analog model, the robots
track other robots as well as orange balls using standard image processing
algorithms. Furthermore the robots have been endowed with a subsystem to
segment the flow of data into distinct events and they then build a situation
model. There is a short term memory which contains the situation model of
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the most recent event and a number of past events.
The robot agents engage in language games - routinised communicative
interactions. Two robots walk around randomly. As soon as one sees the
ball, it comes to a stop and searches for the other robot, which also looks for
the ball and will stop when it sees it. Then the human experimenter pushes
the ball with a stick so that it rolls a short distance, for example from the
left of one robot to its right. This movement is tracked and analyzed by both
robots and each uses the resulting perception as the basis for playing the
language game, in which one of the two (henceforth the ‘speaker’) describes
the ball-moving event to the other (the ‘hearer’). To do this, the speaker must
first conceptualize the event in terms of a set of categories that distinguishes
the latest event from previous ones, for example that the ball rolled away
from the speaker and to the right, as opposed to towards the speaker, or,
away from the speaker but to the left. The speaker then expresses this
conceptualisation using whatever linguistic resources in his inventory cover
the conceptualisation best and have been most successful in the past. The
game is a success if, according to the hearer, the description given by the
speaker not only fits with the scene as perceived by him but is also distinctive
with respect to previous scenes.
Agents take turns playing speaker and hearer so that they each gradually
develop the competence to speak as well as interpret. No prior language nor
prior set of perceptually grounded categories are programmed into the agents.
Indeed the purpose of the experiment is to see what kinds of categories
and linguistic constructions will emerge, and more specifically, whether they
involve perspective marking or not.
The agents use two additional subsystems to achieve this as described
in more detail shortly. The first one performs categorisation and category
formation [Harnad, 1987]. We use here discrimination trees (as explained
further below), although other categorisation methods (e.g. Radial Basis
Function networks or Nearest Neighbour Classification) would work equally
well. The agents apply categorisation to the sensory channels that directly
reflect properties of the visual image computed using standard image pro-
cessing algorithms, such as start and end-position of the ball, angle of the
trajectory, distance traveled by the ball, etc. The second subsystem concerns
the lexicon. We use a bi-directional associative memory which associates one
pattern (here a set of categories) with another pattern (here a word). The
associations are weighted with a score because the same pattern may be
associated (in either direction) with more than one other pattern. Indeed,
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Figure 2: Top row: The scene from figure 1 seen through the cameras of
robots A and B. Second row: From each image, the positions of the ball,
other agents and obstacles are extracted. The images are scanned along lines
orthogonal to the horizon for characteristic gradients in the color channels.
Bottom row: The agents maintain a continuous analog model of their imme-
diate surroundings by integrating the (noisy) information extracted from the
camera images. The graphs show snapshots of this model at the time when
the images in a) and b) were taken.
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one word can have many meanings (synonymy) and several words can be in
competition for the same meaning. In retrieving a target given a source, the
association with the highest score is preferred. Neural implementations of
bi-directional associative memories have been well studied and shown to be
applicable in a wide range of domains [Kosko, 1988].
The behavior of the two subsystems (for categorisation and lexicon lookup)
is structurally coupled in that success in the game raises the score both of
the categories that were used and of the lexical conventions that were used
to express those categories, so that agents progressively come to share not
only their linguistic conventions but also their conceptual repertoires (as ex-
tensively shown in Steels and Belpaeme, 2005).
In addition to subsystems for visually perceiving and acting in a dy-
namically changing world, extracting and memorizing events, discriminating
events from previous ones using discrimination trees, and lexicalising these
distinctions using a bi-directional associative memory, agents are endowed
with a subsystem for egocentric perspective transformation, so that they can
reconstruct a scene from the viewpoint of another agent. This requires that
they first detect where the other agent is located (according to their own per-
ception of the world) and then perform a geometric transformation of their
own world model. Inevitably, an agent’s reconstruction of how another agent
sees the world will never be completely accurate, and may even be grossly in-
correct due to unavoidable misperceptions both of the other robot’s position
and of the real world itself. The sensory values obtained by the robots should
not be interpreted as exact measures (which would be impossible on physical
robots using real world perception) but at best as reasonable estimates. This
type of inaccuracies is precisely what a viable communication system must be
able to cope with and robotic models are therefore the only way to seriously
test and compare strategies and the mechanisms that implement them.
The following subsections provide some more technical detail and exam-
ples of each of these subsystems at work. Readers who are not interested can
skip the remainder of this section and immediately look at the results of the
experiments on perspective alignment and perspective marking.
2.1 Embodiment, Behavior, and Perception
As robots we use the Sony ERS7 AIBO which is a highly complex fully
autonomous and fully programmable robot. In addition to the on-board
computing power, we use an external computer to control the experiment
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Figure 3: The agents are endowed with the ability to segment the continuous
stream of visual data (figure 2) into discrete event descriptions that make
up their situation model. Top row: The event from figure 1 as perceived
from robots A and B. Bottom row: The result of egocentric perspective
transformation. Both robots are able to construct a description of the scene
as it would look like from the perceived position of the other robot.
and engage in some of the symbolic aspects of each robot’s behavior.
Although there has been a lot of progress in robotics during the last
years, particularly due to the rise of the ‘behavior-based approach to robotics’
[Steels and Brooks, 1994], doing perception and autonomous behavior with
real robots is still an extremely difficult task. We could not have done this
experiment without relying on the existing robot soccer software developed
by Ro¨fer et al. [2004]. The vision system has to deal with noisy and low
resolution (208 × 160 pixel) images from a robot’s camera. Objects like
the ball look very different in different places of the environment due to
slight differences in illumination. Noisy perception introduces the challenge
of maintaining a robust situation model. As the perception can not be always
trusted, the resulting position of the ball is only an estimated position gained
with probabilistic filtering techniques. As shown in figure 3, the two robots
never perceive the scene in exactly the same way.
Behavior-based control systems [Loetzsch et al., 2006] were implemented
for the physical coordination of the robots. Both robots randomly walk
around while avoiding obstacles. Each robot that sees both the ball and
8
a) b)
Figure 4: Two events as subsequently perceived by robot A. The goal of
conceptualization is to find a set of categories that discriminate the recent
event (b) from the previous event (a).
the other robot sends an acoustic signal. Robots continue with random
exploration until a configuration is reached so that they both see the ball
and the other robot and know that the other robot is doing so as well (they
establish a joint attentional frame in the sense of Tomasello, 1995). When
both robots are ready to observe the scene together, a human experimenter
manually moves the ball. The begin and end point of the trajectory are
recorded and sent to the language system via the wireless network (see figure
3).
As shown in the bottom row of figure 3, each robot is able to compute an
additional description of the scene from the perspective of the other robot
(egocentric perspective transform) so that they are in fact able to compute
the situation model from another perspective than their own. Note that this
situation model is not always accurate (due to the difficulty of each robot to
perceive the perception of the other. In figure 3 robot A’s situation model of
B (bottom left in figure 3) is slightly different from robot B’s actual situation
model (top right in figure 3).
2.2 Conceptualisation by the Speaker
The goal of the conceptualisation subsystem is to come up with the meaning
to be expressed by the speaker. This meaning should be such that it discrim-
inates the topic (the most recent event) from the other events in the context.
Conceptualisation decomposes into three subsystems. The first one extracts
a battery of features from the perceived scene. The second categorises the
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objects in the context based on these features, and the third subsystem finds
out which categories are discriminative. Because the speaker can compute
the scene from the perspective of the hearer, he will not only conceptualise
from his own perspective but also from that of the hearer so that he can
determine whether perspective needs to be marked or whether he is going to
be more successful to describe the scene from the perspective of the hearer
because that is more salient and can be done with more established cate-
gories.
It is helpful to see the operation of the different subsystems for a concrete
example. We take the 4116th interaction from a series in a population of 5
agents. Agents 3 and 4 were randomly drawn from the population, agent 3
was randomly assigned to be the speaker and “used” robot body A. Agent 4
was the hearer (robot B). Both have perceived two events (for robot A shown
in fig. 4).
Categorisation operates over 12 feature channels which are calculated for
each event based on straightforward signal processing and pattern recognition
algorithms (see figure 5). For example, channel ball-x1 is the x component
of the start position of the ball, ball-y2 is the y position at the end of
the movement, delta-a is the change in angle of the ball, and so on. For
ease in further processing and in order to be able to compare features, each
channel value is scaled within the interval [0...1]. 1 means that it is a very
high channel value (with the respect to the observed distribution for that
particular channel) and 0 a very low value.
Categorisation itself is performed with a discrimination tree approach de-
scribed in more detail in [Steels, 1996]. In order to help the hearer guess what
the speaker meant, the most salient feature is chosen. Saliency is computed
as the minimum distance of the feature values of the topic to the average
feature values of other events in the context:
channel ball-y2 delta-y roll-angle . . . ball-x1 ball-d1
saliency 0.72 0.70 0.52 . . . 0.00 0.00
As easily seen in figure 4, the features ball-y2 (end position left/ right)
and delta-y (change towards left/ right) are much more salient than ball-x1
(start position far/ close) and ball-d1 (distance to the ball at the begin-
ning).
There is a discrimination tree for every feature channel. Each tree divides
the range of possible values into equally sized regions, and every region carves
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Figure 5: The feature values for the event in figure 4a).
out a single category. For example for agent 3 the category category-4
covers the interval [0,0.5] on feature channel ball-y2 (figure 6). The
set of all categories of an agent is called his ontology. Every category in
the ontology has a score which is based on past success in the language
games. Through adjustements of the score, agents progressively become
aligned because the score also reflects not only the categories that are relevant
in the scenes that they encounter but also those that are commonly used in
the group.
In order to find a discriminating category, the categories for the most
salient feature(s) are computed and then those categories retained that are
unique for the topic. In the present example, this is the ball ends right
(category-4). When there is no discriminating category for the most salient
feature channels in the ontology, the ontology is extended by refining a cate-
gory applicable to the topic. Refinement of a category c happens by dividing
the region of c into two equally sized subregions, which then yield two new
subcategories. In the current experiment, the tree depth of the ontology
never had to go deeper than one however.
We use predicate-calculus notation (in prefix) to display the ‘meaning’
that is being expressed by the speaker (and reconstructed by the hearer).
The predicates consist of all the categories in the ontology of the agent and
the arguments are the event and the truth value. Here is an example:
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Figure 6: The ontology of agent 3 after 4412 games.
(category-4 event-16462 t)
2.3 Perspective Reversal by the Speaker
In some of the experiments we investigate the role of perspective alignment
and perspective reversal. As mentioned earlier, we have endowed the agents
with the capacity of egocentric perspective transform, so that they can not
only build up a situation model of themselves but also of what the other
robot is supposed to see. If that is the case, the speaker can check whether
the discriminating category of the scene which is valid for his own situation
model also holds for that of the hearer. If so, perspective does not need to
be marked (the perception of that feature of the scene is shared). Other-
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wise, the meaning to be expressed is extended with an additional predicate
(‘own-perspective’) to specify that the perspective is seen from the one of
the speaker. In the example, the category is not discriminative for the sit-
uation model from the hearer’s perspective, in fact it does not even hold in
this model (the ball moves to the left in both events for the hearer). Hence
the meaning is expanded by a perspective indicator:
(category-4 event-16462 t)
(own-perspective event-16462 t)
Alternatively, the speaker can completely conceptualise the scene from
the viewpoint of the hearer and will choose it if it can be done with a more
salient feature channel and based on a more established category. As one
can see in figure 3 (left bottom), for the assumed perspective of the hearer
(robot B) the change in x position (channel delta-x ) is the most salient
channel, and the appropriate category (which happens to be category-7 or
moves forward) can now be used.
Meanings are ranked based on saliency and category score. The descrip-
tion with the highest score is then used in lexicalization. For the present case
we have:
(category-4 event-16462 t) 0.393 ; from own perspective
(category-7 event-16462 t) 0.363 ; from other perspective
So the first meaning is the best one from the viewpoint of conceptualisation.
In the third experiment to be discussed later, the perspective is explicitly
marked, which implies that it must be part of the meaning transmitted from
the conceptualisation subsystem to the lexical subsystem. Perspective is
represented with two predicates own-perspective and other-perspective, as
in:
(category-7 event-16462 t)
(other-perspective event-16462 t)
2.4 The Lexicon for the Speaker
Each agent has a linguistic inventory, the lexicon (figure 7). It is a bidirec-
tional associative memory that associates abstract meanings (predicates and
arguments with variables) to forms (words). Each association has a weight
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Figure 7: The lexicon of agent 3 after 4412 games.
which acts as a score, reflecting how well the word involved had success in
previous language games. We know from many earlier experiments that a
reinforcement learning approach using lateral inhibition is an effective way
to self-organise a lexicon [Steels, 2001]. The speaker selects the smallest set
of words that covers the complete meaning to be expressed (in the present
example this is fupowi votozu). In case there are alternative solutions, the
form-meaning pairs with the highest score are used. Whenever the speaker
does not have a word for the whole meaning or part of it, a new word is
invented by combining random syllables and associating them with the un-
covered meaning.
2.5 Lexicon Lookup and Conceptualisation by the Hearer
The hearer uses the same knowledge sources (lexicon and ontology) but in
the reverse direction. He looks up the words in the lexicon and reconstructs
the possible meanings. Usually there are several possibilities as words may be
ambiguous. Next he applies to interpret these meanings by matching them
against the (reconstructed) situation model of the speaker and then his own
situation model.
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Figure 8: Subsequent interactions in a population of 5 agents (games 5000–
5020).
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2.6 Feedback
A game is a success if the hearer knows all the words in the utterance and
if the extracted meanings are true and discriminating for the current event.
Everything else is a failure. Communicative success is the only measure that
drives the coherence of perceptual categories and lexical items among the
agents of a population. Therefore, each category and meaning-form associa-
tion has a score that reflects its overall success in communication.
After a successful game, the score of the lexical entries that were used
for production or parsing is increased by 0.05. At the same time, the scores
of competing lexical entries with the same form but different meanings are
decreased by 0.05 (lateral inhibition). In case of a failure, the score of the
involved items is decreased by 0.05. This scoring adjustement not only acts
as a reinforcement learning mechanism but also as priming mechanism so
that agents gradually align their lexicons in consecutive games.
When the hearer does not know one of the words of the utterance, he con-
ceptualizes the scene himself by using the meanings that are already known
from the utterance and the additional meanings are then associated with the
unknown word(s). This step leads to a kind of replicator dynamics, because
words invented or used by the speaker become part of the repertoire of the
hearer which could then use it in subsequent interactions.
Agents not only play a single game, but take turns playing games (see
figure 8) and it is through these consecutive games that a consensus gradu-
ally arises in the group. Not only the lexicons become aligned but also the
ontologies. More and more agents will prefer to use the same conceptuali-
sation in the same sort of circumstances and use similar words for similar
meanings.
3 Experimental Results for Perspective Align-
ment
As stated in the introduction, we want to show why perspective is relevant
in spatial language and how agents manage to align and mark perspective.
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3.1 The Need to Consider Perspective
We begin with a first experiment to argue the first point stated in section
1: As soon as agents are embodied, they necessarily have a specific view
on the world and spatial language becomes impossible without considering
perspective. It is straightforward to do a very clear experiment with the
mechanisms introduced in the previous section.
First we show in a baseline condition that the cognitive mechanisms pro-
posed earlier for behavior, perception, conceptualisation, and lexicalisation
are adequate when both agents engaged in a dialogue perceive the scene
through the same camera and hence have exactly the same situation model.
Although there is still some form of embodiment here (in the sense of using
real vision and real world action), it is not ‘real’ embodiment in the sense
of each agent having their own body. As shown in figure 9, communicative
success quickly increases to 90% and the average lexicon size of the agents
is 10. These results are based on 10 runs of 5000 language games each. We
show the average and the variance. So this experiment shows convincingly
that the mechanisms proposed here work properly.
In the next condition, the agents perceive the scene through their own
camera but they do not take perspective into account. The results are shown
in figure 10. Now they do not manage to agree on a shared set of spatial
terms. Communicative success does not reach 10%. This clearly proves the
first thesis, namely that grounded spatial language without perspective does
not lead to the bootstrapping of a successful communication system for this
kind of communicative task.
3.2 Perspective without marking
The next argument we wanted to make is the following: Perspective align-
ment is possible when the agents are endowed with two abilities: (i) to see
where the other one is located, and (ii) to perform a geometric transforma-
tion known as Egocentric Perspective Transform. Both of these abilities have
been implemented for the robots as explained earlier and so it is now possible
to do an experiment that exercises these mechanisms.
When agents are able to perform egocentric perspective transformation
and when the allocentric situation model is used as well in conceptualization,
a successful communication system indeed emerges (figure 11.) Communica-
tive success again reaches 90% and the lexicon stabilizes. This is even without
17
Figure 9: Agents have the same sensory information and hence share their
situation model. They quickly self-organise a lexicon and ontology.
Figure 10: Agents do not share sensory stimuli and do not consider perspec-
tive. The system does not come off the ground.
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marking perspective. The reason the agents are nevertheless successful is be-
cause they continuously check from each perspective what a possible meaning
or a possible interpretation might be. So we have at once an answer to the
question how it is possible for two partners in dialogue to align perspective
even if there is no explicit marking.
3.3 The Role of Perspective Marking
We now perform a third experiment to examine the third thesis: Perspective
alignment takes less cognitive effort if perspective is marked. In the previous
experiment, the hearer has to guess (by trying to interpret the utterance
for both perspectives) which perspective was used and the speaker has to
compute both perspectives to make sure he chooses the one that will have
most success with the hearer. This obviously results in a higher cognitive
effort for the hearer. Cognitive effort is defined as the average number of
additional perspective transformations that the hearer has to perform and
was shown already in figure 11.
Now we change slightly the language architecture for each agent. The
chosen perspective is made explicitly a part of the meaning so that it becomes
lexicalised. For example, as in:
(category-7 event-16462 t)
(other-perspective event-16462 t)
and this will automatically lead to an expression of perspective. Note
that the lexicon formation process is completely general. It tries to cover the
complete meaning with the smallest number of words and invents new words
for parts that are not yet covered. Nevertheless we see that separate words
emerge for perspective in addition to words where perspective is part of the
lexicalisation of the predicate. This is similar to natural language where in
“the ball to my left”, “my” is a general indicator of perspective, whereas
in the German “hinein” (“into” from outside perspective) versus “herein”
(“into” from inside perspective) or English “come” and “go”, perspective is
integrated in the individual word. So this experiment explains why perspec-
tive marking occurs in human languages and why sometimes we find specific
words for it.
As shown in figure 12, communicative success remains high but the cogni-
tive effort dramatically decreases compared to the earlier experiment. Com-
municative success is not as high as in the previous experiment without
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perspective marking (figure 11). This is due to the fact that the learning
problem is harder for the agents as they additionally have to agree on a set
of perspective markers or words that incorporate domain categories and a
perspective marker, but if we look at a longer series of games we see that a
similar level of success is reached. We have moreover a more compact lexicon
as in the previous experiment.
4 Conclusion
This paper is significant from two points of view. On the one hand, it shows
a novel way to investigate spatial language and perspective, namely by do-
ing experiments in which physically embodied agents (robots) are endowed
with a ‘language faculty’ that allows them to bootstrap a communication
system autonomously (i.e. without human intervention) and from scratch.
This rather new methodology is complementary to empirical observations of
human dialogue and helps us to develop and test ‘mechanistic’ theories of di-
alogue [Cangelosi and Parisi, 2002]. On the other hand, we could show very
precisely why perspective is essential for spatial language, how speaker and
hearer could align perspective - even without marking-, and why and how
perspective could become explicitly marked as part of spatial dialogue.
Acknowledgements . The experiments rest on the Fluid Construction
Grammar framework [Steels and De Beule, 2006], which is highly complex
software for language processing to which Nicolas Neubauer and Joachim De
Beule have made major contributions. The authors also thank the members
of the “GermanTeam” for providing their robot soccer software and Remi
van Trijp for editorial help with the paper. This research was funded and
carried out at the Sony Computer Science Laboratory in Paris with additional
funding from the EU FET ECAgents Project IST-1940.
References
A. Cangelosi and D. Parisi. Computer simulation: a new scientific approach
to the study of language evolution. In A. Cangelosi and D. Parisi, editors,
Simulating the Evolution of Language, pages 3–28. Springer-Verlag New
York, Inc., New York, NY, USA, 2002.
20
Figure 11: Agents are able to adopt the interlocutor perspective but do
not mark their perspective choice in language. They manage again to self-
organise a spatial language system.
Figure 12: Agents now additionally mark their perspective choice in lan-
guage. This maintains communicative success but results in a decrease of
cognitive effort.
21
L. A. Carlson and P. L. Hill. Formulating spatial descriptions across various
dialogue contexts. this volume.
H. Clark. Using Language. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK,
1996.
S. Harnad. Categorical Perception: The Groundwork of Cognition. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1987.
T. Iachini and R. H. Logie. The role of perspective in locating position in a
real-world, unfamiliar environment. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 17(6):
715–732, 2003.
B. Kosko. Bidirectional associative memories. IEEE Transactions on Sys-
tems, Man and Cybernetics, 18(1):49–60, 1988.
M. Loetzsch, M. Risler, and M. Ju¨ngel. XABSL - A pragmatic approach
to behavior engineering. In Proceedings of the IEEE/RSJ International
Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS 2006), pages 5124–
5129, Beijing, 2006.
M. J. Pickering and S. Garrod. Toward a mechanistic psychology of dialogue.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 27(2):169–190, 2004.
T. Ro¨fer, R. Brunn, I. Dahm, M. Hebbel, J. Hoffmann, M. Ju¨ngel, T. Laue,
M. Lo¨tzsch, W. Nistico, and M. Spranger. GermanTeam 2004. In
RoboCup 2004: Robot Soccer World Cup VIII Preproceedings, Lisbon,
Portugal, 2004. RoboCup Federation. Extended version (299 pages) at
http://www.germanteam.org/GT2004.pdf.
M. F. Schober. Spatial dialogue between partners with mismatched abilities.
this volume.
M. F. Schober. Spatial perspective taking in conversation. Cognition, 47(1):
1–24, 1993.
L. Steels. Language games for autonomous robots. IEEE Intelligent Systems,
16(5):16–22, 2001.
L. Steels. Evolving grounded communication for robots. Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 7(7):308–312, 2003.
22
L. Steels. Perceptually grounded meaning creation. In M. Tokoro, editor,
Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Multi-Agent Sys-
tems ICMAS’96, pages 338–344, Menlo Park, CA, 1996. AAAI Press.
L. Steels and T. Belpaeme. Coordinating perceptually grounded categories
through language: A case study for colour. Behavioral and Brain Sciences,
28(4):469–489, 2005.
L. Steels and R. Brooks. The Artificial Life Route to Artificial Intelligence.
Building Situated Embodied Agents. Lawrence Erlbaum Ass., New Haven,
1994.
L. Steels and J. De Beule. Unify and merge in fluid construction grammar.
In P. Vogt, Y. Sugita, E. Tuci, and C. Nehaniv, editors, Symbol Ground-
ing and Beyond: Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on the
Emergence and Evolution of Linguistic Communication, EELC 2006, vol-
ume 4211 of Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, pages 197–223, Rome,
Italy, 2006. Springer Verlag.
M. Tomasello. Joint attention as social cognition. In C. Moore and P. J.
Dunham, editors, Joint Attention: Its Origins and Role in Development.
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ, 1995.
J. Zacks, B. Rypma, J. Gabrieli, B. Tversky, and G. H. Glover. Imagined
transformations of bodies: an fMRI investigation. Neuropsychologia, 37
(9):1029–40, 1999.
23
